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We demonstrate a point-to-point clock synchronization protocol based on bidirectionally exchanging photons
produced in spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC). The technique exploits tight timing correla-
tions between photon pairs to achieve a precision of 51 ps in 100 s with count rates of order 200 s−1. The
protocol is distance independent, secure against symmetric delay attacks and provides a natural complement
to techniques based on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). The protocol works with mobile parties
and can be augmented to provide authentication of the timing signal via a Bell inequality check.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability to synchronize remote clocks plays an im-
portant role in our infrastructure, from maintaining co-
herence in the electrical grid, to allowing precise position-
ing and navigation, high speed trading, and distributed
data processing. However, many of the techniques to es-
tablish and maintain this time synchronization have been
shown to be susceptible to interference by malicious par-
ties1,2, which can for example spoof the legitimate tim-
ing signal introducing unaccounted for delays, and thus
introducing an error in the calculated time difference be-
tween the remote clocks.
In most protocols, remote parties deduce their clock
offset by measuring signal propagation times with their
devices and comparing the result with a trusted value3–5.
Protocol security then relies on an independent charac-
terization of propagation times6, which can be difficult
for mobile parties or under changing conditions.
In this work, we describe a distance-independent proto-
col using counter-propagating single photons originating
from SPDC pairs. Tight time correlations of photon pairs
generated from spontaneous parametric down-conversion
(SPDC) enable precise synchronization. Similar to exist-
ing bidirectional protocols, clock offsets are determined
independently of signal propagation times for a symmet-
rical communication channel6. The single-photon regime
allows, in principle, an additional security layer by test-
ing a Bell inequality with entangled photons to verify the
origin of the timing signal.
While clock synchronization based on SPDC has been
demonstrated, previous works require knowing a priori
the signal propagation times7–9, or controlling them with
a balanced interferometer10. In contrast, we use a simple
point-to-point single mode optical connection, which is
typical of quantum communication scenarios As a proof-
of-principle demonstration, we synchronize two remote
rubidium clocks while changing their relative separation,
SPDC
BBO SMF
LD
CC
IF
/2
CC
IF
SMF
L
Alice
SPDC
APD
Time stamp
 t
10MHz
Bob
SPDC
APD
10MHz
 t'
Time stamp
FIG. 1. Clock synchronization setup. Alice and Bob each
have a source of time-correlated photon pairs based on sponta-
neous parametric down-conversion (SPDC), and an avalanche
photodetector (APD). One photon of the pair is detected lo-
cally, while the other photon is sent through a single mode
fiber of length L to be detected on the remote side. Times
of arrival for all detected photons are recorded at each side
with respect to the local clock, each locked to a rubidium
frequency reference. The inset shows the optical setup of a
SPDC source11. LD: laser diode, BBO: β-Barium Borate,
CC: compensation crystals, SMF: single mode fiber, λ/2: half-
wave plate.
simulating a symmetric channel delay attack.
II. TIME SYNCHRONIZATION PROTOCOL
The protocol involves two parties, Alice and Bob, con-
nected by a single mode optical channel. Each party has
an SPDC source producing photons pairs, one photon is
detected locally, while the other is sent and detected on
2the remote side (see Fig. 1). Every photodetection event
is time tagged according to a local clock which assigns
time stamps t and t′.
For a propagation time ∆tAB from Alice to Bob, and
∆tBA in the other direction, the detection time differ-
ences are
t′− t=∆tAB + δ and t− t′ =∆tBA− δ (1)
for the photon pairs originating from Alice and Bob, re-
spectively. The sequence of photodetection events on
each side are described by
a(t) =
∑
i
δ (t− ti) and b(t′) =
∑
j
δ
(
t′− t′j
)
. (2)
Due to tight time correlations present during pair gener-
ation, the cross correlation
cAB(τ) = (a⋆ b)(τ) =
∫
a(t)b(t+ τ)dt (3)
will show two peaks at
τAB = δ+∆tAB and τBA = δ−∆tBA (4)
for the pairs created by Alice and Bob. A round-trip
time ∆T for photons can be calculated using the inter-
peak separation,
∆T =∆tAB +∆tBA = τAB− τBA. (5)
If the propagation times in the two directions are the
same, ∆tAB =∆tBA, they do not contribute to the clock
offset
δ =
1
2
(τAB + τBA) , (6)
which is calculated directly from the midpoint of the
two peaks. In this way, the protocol is inherently ro-
bust against symmetric changes in channel propagation
times.
As is the norm in quantum key distribution (QKD)12,
the time stamps are transmitted through a classical pub-
lic authenticated channel, while the quantum channel is
supposed to be under the control of a malicious adver-
sary.
III. EXPERIMENT
Time-correlated photon pairs are generated by two
identical SPDC sources (Fig. 1). The output of a laser
diode (power ≈10mW, central wavelength 405 nm) is
coupled into a single mode optical fiber for spatial mode
filtering and focused to a beam waist of 80µm into a
2mm thick β-Barium Borate crystal cut for non-collinear
type-II phase matching11. Down-converted photons at
810nm are coupled into two single mode fibers; with an
overall detected pair rate of about 200 s−1.
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FIG. 2. Standard deviation (precision δt) of the measured
offset between two clocks. Both clocks are locked to the same
frequency reference. Solid line: Least-squares fit to a model
where δt follows Poisson statistics and improves with acquisi-
tion time Ta. Error bars: precision uncertainty due to errors
from fitting cAB to our model in Eq. 7.
Fiber beam splitters separate the photon pairs so that
one photon is detected locally with an avalanche pho-
todetector (APD), while the other photon is transmitted
to the remote party. Time-stamping units with nominal
resolution ≈ 4 ps assign detection times t and t′ to the
events detected at Alice and Bob, respectively.
To resolve the coincidence peaks (FWHM ≈ 500ps),
we obtain cAB(τ = t
′− t) with coarse (≈ 2µs) and fine
(≈ 16ps) resolutions separately8.
To extract the peak positions τAB and τBA, we fit
cAB(τ) to a linear combination of two peak profiles V (τ),
cAB(τ) = a0+a1V (τ − τAB)+a2V (τ − τBA) , (7)
where a0 denotes background coincidences, a1,2 detected
pairs, and V (τ) is a pseudo-Voigt distribution13
V (τ) = (1− f)G
(
τ,
σ√
2ln2
)
+ f L(τ,σ) . (8)
Values of f = 0.2 and σ = 290ps best characterize the
timing jitter of the combined photodetection and time-
stamping system, and τAB , τBA from the fit fix δ and ∆T
through equations 5 and 6.
IV. RESULTS
A. Synchronization precision
To demonstrate the independence of the protocol from
the clock separation, we first determine the minimum re-
solvable separation (v δt/2), where v is the propagation
speed of light in the fiber, and δt is the precision (1 stan-
dard deviation) of measuring a fixed offset.
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FIG. 3. Timing correlations of Alice and Bob’s detection
events normalized to background coincidences. During the
measurement, four fibers of lengths L were used to change
the separation between Alice and Bob. For every L, the cor-
relation measurement yields two coincidence peaks, one for
each source. The time separation between peaks corresponds
to the round-trip time ∆T , and the midpoint is the offset be-
tween the clocks δ. The time axis is shifted by δ,the average
value of the four δ calculated for four different L.
To characterize the precision δt, we accumulate offset
measurements between two clocks locked to a common
frequency reference (Stanford Research Systems FS725),
separated by a constant fiber length L=1.7m. The stan-
dard deviation of the measured offset depends on the
detector timing response V (τ = 0), pair rate R and ac-
quisition time Ta according to
14
δt=
1√
2
1
2V (τ = 0)
1√
RTa
. (9)
Figure 2 shows the precision of the measured offset for
various Ta, extracted from time stamps recorded over
1 hour. The timing response V (τ = 0) = 1.65(5) ns−1,
extracted from a fit to the data using Eq. 9, closely de-
scribe our detectors (1.5 ns−1).
For an acquisition lasting several seconds, a precision
of a few picoseconds limits the minimum resolvable clock
separation to the millimeter scale. To demonstrate that
the protocol is secure against symmetric channel delay
attacks, we change the propagation length over several
meters during synchronization — three orders of magni-
tude larger than the minimum resolvable length-scale.
B. Distance-independent clock synchronization
To simulate a symmetric channel delay attack, we im-
pose different propagation distances using different fibers
of length L= 1.7m, 6.7m, 31.7m, and 51.7m. Figure 3
shows g(2)(τ), the cross-correlation cAB(τ) normalized to
background coincidences, acquired from the time stamps
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FIG. 4. (a) Measured offset δ between two clocks, both locked
on the same frequency reference. Each value of δ was eval-
uated from measuring photon pair timing correlations from
a block of photodetection times recorded by Alice and Bob.
Each block is 20 s long. The continuous line indicates the av-
erage offset δ. Dashed lines: one standard deviation. (b) The
round-trip time ∆T was changed using different fiber lengths.
recorded over 20 mins. To detect changes in the clock off-
set throughout the acquisition, we split the time-stamped
events into blocks of 20 s. Figure 4 shows the clock off-
set δ and round-trip time ∆T for every block. Through-
out the acquisition, the offset was measured to within
7 ps, comparable to the precision obtained with a con-
stant round-trip time (Fig. 2). With no significant cor-
relation between the measured clock offset and the prop-
agation distance (. 0.12psm−1), we conclude that for
measuring a fixed offset, the protocol is robust against
symmetric channel delay attacks.
C. Distance-independent clock synchronization with
independent clocks
To examine a more realistic scenario, we provide each
time-stamping unit with an independent frequency refer-
ence (both Stanford Research Systems FS725), resulting
in a clock offset that drifts with time δ→ δ(t).
The frequency references have a nominal relative fre-
quency accuracy d0 < 5× 10−11. We evaluate the offset
from the time stamps every Ta = 2 s so that the drift
(≈ 100ps) is much smaller than the FWHM of each coin-
cidence peak. This allows extracting the peak positions
from cAB with the model in Eq. 7.
We again simulate a symmetric channel delay attack
by changing L every 5mins. Figure 5 shows the measured
δ(t) which appears to follow a continuous trend over dif-
ferent round-trip times, indicating that the delay attacks
were ineffective. Discontinuities in δ(t) correspond to pe-
riods when fibers were changed.
To verify that meaningful clock parameters can be ex-
tracted from δ(t) despite the attack, we fit the data to a
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FIG. 5. (a) Measured offset δ between two clocks with differ-
ent frequency references. Each value of δ was evaluated from
measuring photon pair timing correlations for 2 s. The offset
measured at the beginning is δ0. Continuous blue line: fit
used to extract the relative frequency accuracy (≈ 4×10−11)
between the clocks. (b) Residual of the fit fluctuates due to
the intrinsic instability of the individual frequency references.
(c) The round-trip time ∆T was changed using four different
fiber lengths.
parabola at2+dt+ b, where a, d and b represent the rel-
ative aging, frequency accuracy and bias of the frequency
references, respectively15. The resulting relative fre-
quency accuracy between the clocks, d= 4.05(7)×10−11,
agrees with the nominal relative frequency accuracy d0
of our frequency references. The residual of the fit, r(t),
fluctuates (Allan deviation = 1.1×10−12, time deviation
TDEV = 45ps, in 100 s) mainly due to the intrinsic in-
stabilities of our frequency references (< 2×10−12). Neg-
ligible correlation between r(t) and propagation distance
(. 0.78psm−1) demonstrates the distance-independence
of this protocol.
The standard deviation (δt ≈ 51 ps) of the fast fluc-
tuating component of r(t) suggests that the clocks can
be synchronized to a precision comparable to the time
deviation of our frequency references in 100 s. This inte-
gration time reduces with detectors with a lower timing
jitter, higher efficiency, a higher path transmission, and
with brighter pair sources (Eq. 9).
V. PROTOCOL SECURITY
Although not demonstrated in this work, Alice and
Bob can verify the origin of each photon by synchronizing
with polarization-entangled photon pairs and performing
a Bell measurement to check for correspondence between
the local and transmitted photons. As is the case in QKD
scenarios16, if the signal is copied (cloned) or the entan-
gled degree of freedom is otherwise disturbed, the extent
of the interference can be bounded via a Bell inequal-
ity. For this measurement, the setup in Fig. 1 should be
modified such that the detectors are preceded by a po-
larization measurement in the appropriate basis and that
measurement result is added to the time stamp infor-
mation transmitted through the classical channel. This
modification addresses the issue of spoofing in current
classical synchronization protocols.
In addition, we made the strong assumption that the
photon propagation times in both directions were equal
(∆tAB = ∆tBA). Without this assumption, the offset
derived from Eq. 6 becomes
δ =
1
2
[(τAB + τBA)− (∆tAB−∆tBA)]. (10)
Therefore, the offset can no longer be obtained from the
midpoint between τAB and τBA.
We note that while creating an asymmetric channel for
a classical signal is routine given the ability to split and
amplify the signal at will; in the case of entangled pho-
tons produced at random times, making an asymmetric
channel implies breaking the reciprocity of the channel.
This is possible, via for example magneto-optical effects
such as found in optical circulators. Detecting this attack
is the subject of ongoing research17.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated a protocol for synchronizing
two remote clocks with time-correlated photon pairs gen-
erated from SPDC. By assuming symmetry in the syn-
chronization channel, our protocol does not require a pri-
ori knowledge of the relative distance or propagation
times between two parties, providing security against
symmetric channel delay attacks and timing signal au-
thentication via the measurement of a Bell inequality.
We observe a synchronization precision of 51 ps within
100 s, which is comparable to the time deviation arising
from the intrinsic instability of our frequency references,
even with relatively low pair rates (≈ 200 s−1).
The protocol lends itself particularly well to synchro-
nization tasks performed between mobile stations (e.g.,
between satellites and ground stations) where photon
rates are typically low, and propagation times are con-
stantly changing. Since the protocol is based on existing
quantum communication techniques, it provides a natu-
ral complement to Global Navigation Satellite Systems
(GNSS) and would be a natural fit to future quantum
networks with the ability to distribute entanglement.
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